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Science and International Regulatory

Convergence
Jeffery A tik*
I.

INTRODUCTION

National regulation is frequently premised on scientific assumptions; much of regulatory design is based on scientific findings. Consumer product, food and drug and workplace safety standards all
depend on a scientific assessment of the risks faced by the public and
of the efficacy of an adopted measure in addressing these risks. Building codes, waste disposal protocols and mandated immunization of
school children all proceed from the technical recommendations of
the scientific community.
In current Western society, a regulatory measure lacking a scientific basis will be subject to criticism and perhaps ridicule; it may be
struck down as exceeding the prescriptive powers of the regulator.'
Science identifies areas for regulatory action while limiting the field of
possible responses. Not all human needs or desires can be usefully
pursued through regulatory means; there is little our public institutions can do to address the eventual implosion of the sun. Science
cannot at present show us how to harness nuclear fusion, predict
earthquakes or prevent hair loss; it cannot cure cancer or AIDS.
Where regulatory action is indicated, science operates to prohibit cer* Professor of Law, Suffolk University (Boston). Eric Blumenson, Stephen Hicks, Stephen
Mcfohn, Robert Preucel, Michael Rustad and Joel Trachtman provided helpful criticism. I am

most grateful for comments from the participants at the Institutionsfor InternationalEconomic
Integration conference and for the research assistance of Ahmed Khan.
1 In the United States, a regulatory measure lacking a scientific foundation may not meet
the rational basis test under United States v. Carolene Products Co., 305 U.S. 144 (1938). See
Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products,98 HARv. L. REv. 713 (1985). The rational basis
test might incorporate scrutiny for scientific validity in many regulatory settings. In practice,
courts have rarely found a measure to fail the rational basis test. See American Textile Mfr.'s
Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
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tain responses and to guide the decision-maker to value some responses more than others.
Still, regulatory design and implementation is much more than a
technical exercise.' Notwithstanding the movement to transform
rulemaking into a scientific discipline, 3 real-world regulatory determinations remain political.4 Where the dominant politics are national in
scope, particularized national regulatory outcomes can be expected
even where the scientific foundation for regulatory action is identical
across nations. National polities addressing similar concerns are likely
to choose a variety of regulatory approaches in response to the local
variation in the distribution of power. In global economic politics,
new and complex dynamics have emerged to test national regulatory
outcomes. As global concerns challenge the national interests in more
politand more fields of regulatory endeavor, powerful iransboundary
5
decision-making.
national
on
ical forces are exerted
The WTO accords and the NAFTA now require that health regulations have a scientific basis and result from a risk assessment. If a
health measure is founded on scientific principles, there is little other
countries can do to challenge it; if there is no scientific basis for the
measure, it will be subject to attack. Thus an important body of international economic law now hinges on what science, and scientists,
have to say. A test for scientific support for a national regulatory position, no doubt, held a particular allure for international trade negotiators. Science is held to be universal knowledge, grounded in physical
experience, valid for all and neutral in its prescriptions. While risk
assessment involves frankly political choices, it pretends to be a rational and testable methodology.6 The hope for using scientific justification and risk assessment as touchstones may well have been to
reduce international contentiousness and to provide clear scope for
national regulatory freedom-of-motion. Science should tell us un2 Congress has recently imposed a requirement that all federal regulation be accompanied
by a cost-benefit analysis. See Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1551
(West Supp. 1996). There may be an implicit test for a scientific basis in asserting that a proposed regulation produces a certain benefit.
3 Public policy analysis is taught as a quasi-scientific discipline at major U.S. universities.
Cost-benefit analysis is the dominant methodology within public policy analysis, which purports
to signal where regulatory action is warranted and to permit unambiguous rankings of possible

regulatory responses.
4 This assertion is axiomatic within the science of public-choice theory.
5 See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., A Global Perspectiveon Current Regulatory Reforms: Rejection,
Relocation, or Reinvention, 2 INDiANA J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (1995).
6 For a discussion of risk assessment and risk management, see David A. Wirth, The Role of
Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines,27 COPNELL INV'L L.J. 817, 833-37
(1994).
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equivocally whether a U.K. requirement that all imported UHT milk
be repackaged is or is not justified to protect the public health.' The
answer science gives should be as equally persuasive to the British
health authority as to the French dairy.
Science, more than religion, more than traditional ways, is unassailable within its domain.8 And science is more than mere reason; it
is also experience built upon a continuing interaction with the physical
world in a progressive, historical process. Science enjoys an enormous
prestige built on its vast material successes since the Enlightenment.
White coats inspire awe even among the powerful.9
A review of the sociology of science casts significant doubt on
science's ability to play a useful role in depoliticizing international
trade disputes."° Scientific knowledge, one finds, is hardly universal.
What is true and certain within one scientific community constitutes
baseless conjecture in another. Science is also intrinsically historical;
it is science-of-the-moment. Even relatively recent scientific belief
can appear absurd when exposed to contemporary light. Early 20th
Century primatology reveals more about the ape-watchers than about
the apes. Moreover, science is socially constructed." In asserting this,
I do not repeat Alan Sokal's claim (in parody) that the physical universe does not exist and that science is a pure cultural artifact.'2
7 The Court of Justice reached the conclusion that the British regulations could not be justified under the article 36 exception to the Treaty of Rome for "protection of health and life of
humans, animals or plants." Case 124181, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1983 E.C.R. 203.
8 Michael Reisman has written about "a single, inclusive industrial and science-based civilization" which has exerted "great stress on traditional moral and religious doctrines and on those
for whom these ideas are central struts of their existence." W. Michael Reisman, DesigningLaw
Curriculafor a TransnationalIndustrialand Science-Based Civilization, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 322
(1996).
9 Alan Sokal has speculated that one of the reasons he was able to perpetrate the SOCIAL
TEXT hoax was his standing as a hard scientist. The SOCIAL TEXT editors, according to Sokal,
may have been "more deferent to the so-called 'cultural authority of technosicence' that they
would care to admit." Alan D. Sokal, A Physicist Experiments with CulturalStudies, 46 LINGUA
FRANCA 62-64 (1996). See the discussion of the SOCIAL TEXT affair infra note 48 and accompanying text.
10 See DAVID BLooR, KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL IMAGERY (2d ed. 1991). There is a strong
feminist critique of scientific neutrality. See e.g., SANDRA HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN
FxnNIsM (1986).

11 See BLooR, supra note 10. In certain notorious cases, a particularized local science served
local political ends. Examples include Nazi racial studies and Lysenko's genetics within the Soviet Union.
12 I hope to avoid "the style and intellectual approach of the standard mediocre progressive
post-structuralist paper available cheap over every academic counter these days" decried in

Gary Kamiya's essay on the SOCIAL TEXT affair. Gary Kamiya, Transgressingthe Transgressors:

Toward a Transformative Hermeneuticsof Total Bullshit, SALON, May 17, 1996; see Salon Daily
Clicks: Media Circus <http://www.salonl999.com/media/media960517.html>.
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Rather, for purposes of this essay, I need only suggest that culture is a
sufficiently powerful determinant to generate multiple scientific consensuses which are varied across nations; more local than universal.
If we permit our imaginations to conceive of variegated science,
differing in important features as distributed around the world, science's soundness as a regulatory anchor is surely disturbed. I propose
in this essay a "geography" of science which in turn will generate odd
territories of regulatory convergence. Competing sciences may produce varied regulatory solutions, any one of which may be legitimately
adopted under the new WTO and NAFTA standards regimes. Some
regulatory solutions will sharply diverge; other approaches will be
shared across certain national boundaries. Regulatory convergence
(economic integration) driven by something other than economic considerations is a likely result of a science-driven discipline.
In this essay, I advance three principal arguments:
1. The new science-based regimes for disciplining health regulation represent a substantial restoration of rulemaking authority to national institutions. Unlike other approaches, such as the least-trade
restrictive means test and the principle of proportionality, which
weigh national interests against those of the larger world trade community, this new recognition of national regulatory autonomy is
categorical.
2. Science is variegated. Multiple sciences will generate multiple
regulatory approaches, most of which will survive trade challenge.
3. Science may promote the development of economic integration, but in ways very different from trade-dominated approaches
aimed at regulatory convergence. Both the NAFTA and the WTO are
marked by an absence of a rule-making body with power to set regulatory limits; it is within this institutional gap that scientific justification
will operate to generate norms and rules. Centers of scientific authority will exercise influence on the patterns of regulatory design. This
structure of influence necessarily invokes a discussion of power.
II.

SCIENCE AND NATIONAL REGULATORY AUTONOMY

Regulatory standards have long been recognized to be potential
impediments to international trade even when justified by legitimate
national concerns. The proliferation of technical standards, particularly in the fields of consumer protection, environmental protection
and health and safety, has led to concerns about their restrictive effect
on foreign-sourced goods and services. The world trade system's response to technical standards has been to label these regulations
739
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"non-tariff barriers" and so condemn them. 13 This hostility to distinctive national standards, revealed in a number of trade disputes, has
led, in turn, to arguable overstepping of national sensibilities.' 4 The
reaction, on many fronts, has been a reassertion of national regulatory
prerogative.
Science will play an enhanced role in mediating tensions between
national regulatory concerns and the demands of the international
community. This can be immediately seen within the new technical
standards regimes established by the post-Uruguay round GAT!
WTO and the NAFTA.' 5 Within certain defined categories of regulation, "scientific justification" and "risk assessment" pre-empt freetrade notions, such as the least-trade restrictive means tests or the
principle of proportionality, as the mark against which national measures are tested.' 6 Health regulations, generally speaking, where supported by a scientific justification and resulting from a risk assessment,
will be substantially immune from free-trade challenge. The new science-based standards disciplines represent a pendulum-swing back
towards greater national discretion and a move away from the monolithic prescriptions of the world trading system.
The broad area of health regulation is unique for the moment in
its explicit invocation of scientific and quasi-scientific notions, such as
risk assessment, as the identifying markers for a presumption of regulatory correctness. In the future, scientific tests for regulatory validity
may move into new substantive areas, operating as a general check on
supranational discipline as analagous to the rational basis test in U.S.
constitutional law in defining the general limits of substantive due
process.
The current special treatment of health regulation may imply that
national regulatory freedom-of-action is diminished in other areas.
13 See Jack I. Garvey, CurrentDevelopment: Trade Law and Quality of Life-Dispute Reso-

lution under the NAFTA Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 439,
441 (1995). See also Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free InternationalTrade and Protection of the Environment: IrreconcilableConflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700 (1992).

14 The Tuna-Dolphin case is often cited as an example of GATT's inability to integrate nontrade aspects of an international regulatory dispute. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Dolphins and
Hormones: GATT and the Legal Environment for InternationalTrade After the Uruguay Round,
ROCK L.J. 429 (1992); Ted L. McDorman, The GATT Consistency of U.S.
14 U. ARa. Lrrr
Fish Import Embargoes to Stop Driftnet Fishingand Save Whales, Dolphins and Turtles, 24 GEo.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECoN. 477, 525 (1991).

15 See Wirth, supra note 6.
16 See John J. Barcel6 III, ProductStandardsto Protectthe Local Environment- the GATT
and the Uruguay Round Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 755

(1994).
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Non-favored areas of national regulation may now be more exposed
to challenge under the WTO or the NAFTA free trade principles. As
such, it may represent part of an overall strengthening of the world
trading system rather than a retreat, notwithstanding these new and
explicit concessions to national autonomy.
Prior to the Uruguay Round, so-called technical barriers to trade
(TBT) had been addressed in the 1979 TBT Agreement, 7 a GATT
"code" or side agreement. The 1979 TBT Agreement had limited effect in eliminating disparate technical standards due in part to the restricted number of GAT contracting parties who subscribed to it and
to weaknesses in the GAIT dispute resolution mechanism.' 8 The
GATT Article XX(b) 19 and its 1979 TBT Agreement counterpart20
generally operated to exempt national regulations promoting public
health from GATT scrutiny. So long as a health regulation was necessary2 ' and did not constitute a "means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination" or "pose a disguised restriction on international
trade,"' it would be upheld in GATr dispute resolution proceedings.
During the Uruguay Round, the 1979 TBT Agreement was revised and extended, resulting in the "WTO TBT Agreement."' 3 Further, the WTO TBT Agreement was augmented by a specific
agreement on so-called sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures,24
covering regulation by the WTO members premised on human,
animal and plant health concerns.2 5 It is this second agreement, the
17 See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12,1979,31 U.S.T. 405; 1186 U.N.T.S.
276 [hereinafter TBT Code].
18 See Jacques Nusbaumer, The GATT Standards Code in Operation,18 J. WoRLD TRADE L.
542 (1984).
19 Article XX(b) grants national measures justified by public health considerations an exception to normal GATT rules against trade restrictions. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX(b), 2 U.S.T. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT).
20 See TBT Code, supra note 17, art. 2.2.
21 See GATT, supra note 19, art. XX(b). See, e.g., Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of
and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GAT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200, paras. 74-81
(1991).
22 These phrases are contained in the chapeauor overall heading to Article XX, and limit the
availability of Article XX's various exceptions to GATT's requirements. See generally Barcel6,
supra note 16, at 771.
23 See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, GATT Doe. MTN/FA II-A1A-6 (Dec. 15,
1993) [hereinafter WTO TBT Agreement].
24 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, GATT Doc.
MTN/FA II-A1A-4 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter WTO SPS Agreement]. See also Julie Cromer,
Sanitaryand PhytosanitaryMeasures: What They Could Mean for Health and Safety Regulations
Under GATT, 36 HARV. IN-r'r. L. J. 557 (1995).
25 The WTO SPS Agreement defines sanitary and phytosanitary measures. See WTO SPS
Agreement, supra note 24, Annex A § 1. See generally Understandingthe World Agreement on
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WTO SPS Agreement, which most directly invokes the scientific basis
test to determine if a WTO member's SPS regulations may prevail.
A special regime for SPS measures has also been incorporated in
NAFTA.2 6 Non-SPS measures within NAFTA are governed by the
chapter on "Standards-Related Measures." 7 NAFTA provides for
SPS measures in a separate chapter titled "Agriculture and Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures." '
Like the VTO SPS Agreement,
NAFFA's SPS provisions create a presumption of national autonomy
which can be challenged by a showing that a measure lacks a scientific
basis.2 9

This special treatment for SPS measures within the VITO and
NAFTA recognizes the heightened concerns of national and local interests in matters pertaining to health. Science plays an important
role in setting regulatory standards generally and a particularly enhanced role in SPS standards where human, animal and plant life are
implicated. The regulatory objective in SPS measures is always, at
least in part, the promotion of "health," which is partly a scientific
construct. 30 Health is not, however, the unitary objective of sanitary
and phytosanitary regulation; there remains room for other significant
considerations, such as culture, economic efficiency, etc. in generating
SPS rules.

Sanitary and phytosanitary standards have been, for the most
part, established at the national or subnational level. States have enjoyed autonomy and wide discretion in setting regulatory standards
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (visited Feb. 25, 1997) <http://
www.wto.org/wto/agric/spsagr.htm>.
26 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, ch. 7, 32 I.L.M. 289, 368
[hereinafter NAFTA]. While the NAFTA preceded the closure of the Uruguay Round negotiations, NAFTA's incorporation of SPS provisions was based on draft language under consideration at the GATT. Thus, NAFTA's SPS provisions in some sense follow and in some sense
precede the WTO TBT Agreement and the WTO SPS Agreement.
27 NAFTA, supra note 26, ch. 9, at 386.
28 NAFTA, supra note 26, ch. 7(b), at 368.
29 See NAFTA, supra note 26, art. 712(3). NAFTA art 712(3) provides:
Each Party shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure that it adopts, maintains
or applies is: (a) based on scientific principles, taking into account relevant factors, including, where appropriate, different geographic conditions; (b) not maintained where there is
no longer a scientific basis for it; and (c) based on a risk assessment, as appropriate to the
circumstances.
30 The World Health Organization has adopted a definition of health as "a state of complete
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." CoNsTrruTIoN oF THE WoRLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, preamble. See also Jill Maben & Jill M.
Clark, Health Promotion: A Concept Analysis, 22 J. ADv. NuRs. 1158 (1995); James S.Larson,
The Weighting of an InternationalHealth Status Index, 31 Soc. INDICATORs RES.265 (1994). For
a rejection of a uniform, as opposed to national, definition of health, see Carl E. Taylor, Ethical
Issues Influencing Health for All Beyond the Year 2000, 9 INr'c. Dis. CLN.N. AM. 223 (1995).
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concerning human, animal and plant health. Similarly they have
freely imposed labor and environmental regulation, a reality acknowledged by the existence of the two specialized NAFTA side agreements. National standard-makers have been able to take into account
regulatory costs, the state of economic development, peculiar national
exigencies and general regulatory philosophy in deciding where and
how to act. The WTO standards agreements31 and the NAFTA32 explicitly uphold the right of each signatory to set its own standards in
the health field. This explicit reservation of national autonomy is consistent with the deference to national invocation of scientific justification and risk assessment under the SPS provisions of each agreement.
The new standard regimes created by the WTO and the NAFTA
insist on the presence of a scientific justification for regulation in the
sanitary and phytosanitary arenas. Absent scientific justification,
these measures are open to trade attack. Both the WTO SPS Agreement and the NAFTA's SPS provisions require that SPS measures
have a scientific basis and that standards result from a process of risk
assessment. 3 The requirement of a scientific justification may be seen
as a limit on regulatory arbitrariness; all possible regulatory responses
are no longer permitted. For the test to have meaning, there must be
the possibility of a dispute panel finding the absence of a scientific
justification.
Thus the new regimes operate in tandem with other notions as to
the vertical distribution of regulatory competence,34 such as the EU's
notion of subsidiarity.35 Unlike subsidiarity, which is sensitive to the
particular regulatory case, the science-based SPS regimes categorically
empower the nations to regulate in the SPS sphere. In contrast with
the U.S. commerce clause, which categorically distributes competence
upward to the federal government, the SPS regimes distribute competence downward to the nations.36 Even where a showing can be made
that a regional or global regulatory treatment is optimal, harmonization cannot be compelled. And there is no weighing of benefits to
31 See W17O SPS Agreement, supra note 24, pmbl. para. 6, paras. 11, 14, 18,19,20,21,29,32,
41, and Annex B, para. 2.1(c).
32 See NAFTA, supra note 26, art. 712, paras. 1, 2, at 377-78. See generally Jeffery Atik,

EnvironmentalStandards Within NAFTA: Difference by Design and the Retreatfrom Harmonization, 3 INDLANA J. GLOBAL L. S-tu. 81 (1995).
33 See Wirth, supra note 6, at 826-28, 830-31.
34 See Joel P. Trachtman, InternationalRegulatory Competition, Externalization,and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L Li. 47 (1993).
35 See Joel P. Trachtman, L'Eta4 C'est Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration and Subsidiarity, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 459, 468-72 (1992).
36 The U.S. constitutional analogue may be the Tenth Amendment.
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local health and safety against costs to the global economy. SPS regulation is a field of nearly unrestricted national prerogative.
A showing of scientific justification under either the WTO SPS
Agreement or the NAFTA's SPS provisions provides substantial, but
not absolute, immunity against a trade-challenge. Both the WTO SPS
Agreement and the NAFrA condemn an SPS measure that constitutes a "disguised restraint on trade," even if found to be based on
scientific validity and resulting from a risk assessment. Some have argued that the requirement for scientific basis will be an important
check on any abuse of this national privilege and represents a limitation from the freedom GAT[ members enjoyed under the Article
XX(b) exception.3 7
Those national measures which are consistent with generally accepted international standards enjoy greater immunity. A nation
which imposes a different, and particularly "higher," standard is more
vulnerable to pressure by its trading partners, formal and otherwise.3 8
Even where attack may be precluded within formal dispute resolution,
political arenas remain where harmonization may be coerced. A departure from an international standard will be subject to greater visibility, and perhaps this exposure will be exploited on the political
front to induce harmonization.
The presumption of regulatory correctness that attaches to international standards makes the setting of these standards increasingly
important. Power is likely to be distributed quite differently within an
international standard-making body than within a general economic
organization such as the WTO or the NAFTA. Certain interests are
unlikely to be represented;3 9 others (particularly producers) may well
exercise inordinate influence on outcomes.
The requirement of risk assessment poses a new procedural requirement into national law-making. In order for an SPS measure to
be upheld, it must result from a risk assessment; both the WTO SPS
Agreement and the NAFTA's SPS provisions grant nearly complete
discretion to legislatures to enact SPS measures where risk assessment
37 See Cromer, supra note 24, at 563.

38 WTO TBT Agreement, supra note 23, art. 2, para. 5, provides that:

Whenever a technical regulation is prepared, adopted or applied for one of the legitimate
objectives explicitly mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 2 [including national security requirements; prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal
or plant life or health, or the environment] and is in accordance with relevant international
standards, it shall be rebuttably presumed not to create an unnecessary obstacle to international trade.
39 The absence of women's voices in debates on the regulation of birth control measures has
often been noted.

744
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has been performed. There is considerable elasticity in this requirement. Where weighting of risks remain unspecified, mere identification of risks may be adequate to satisfy a test for risk assessment. A
rulemaker that notes that a substance has been shown, to any degree,
to cause cancer in laboratory animals may have performed adequate
risk assessment for purposes of staving off a trade challenge advanced
by a trading partner to an import restriction. Taken seriously then,
these new regimes will significantly impact the process of national
standard-making. National administrative law will take defensive
measures to foreclose a WTO attack premised on the procedural failure to conduct risk assessment. WTO-type risk assessment may become as much a matter of course as environmental impact studies, and
scientific justifications for regulatory measures will be recited as

custom.
The new standards regimes demand risk assessment, but where
there is a scientific basis for regulation and where risk assessment has
been undertaken, SPS measures will be allowed to stand. Masked
within this facially rational methodology is the potential for considerable irrational policy. Nations can maintain SPS measures, even when
risks to health and safety are demonstrably minute. For example, a 1
in 500 million probability of causing cancer may still justify the United
States banning a good, even though its harm, statistically speaking,
might not affect more than one or two U.S. persons. Risks of such
magnitude are considerably smaller than risks assumed in normal life,
such as airline travel, driving cars, sunning oneself at the beach or
drinking tap water.
The requirement that a SPS measure be premised on a scientific
basis represents a middle-ground between a more searching cost-benefit analysis that introduces international economic values and the
quite liberating rational relationship test. 40 A requirement of a scientific basis would seem to apply to both the regulatory objective as well
as the means chosen to achieve it. A legislature could not merely find
that, say, ultra-high frequency radiation is harmful, and then prescribe
that computer monitors be shielded; science would have to support
both the threat to health and the efficacy of the responsive measure.
Cost-benefit would go beyond this, of course, and insist that the benefit of avoiding the harm caused by the radiation outweigh the regulatory cost. Rational relationship, on the other hand, might be satisfied
by a mere probability of regulatory efficacy.
40 See Barcel6, supra note 16, at 768-74 (discussing the Cost-Benefit Balancing Test of the
WTO SPS Agreement).

745
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III. VARIEGATED SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW

Within the academy, scientific disciplines have been most resistant to the challenges of multiculturalism and relativism. Indeed,
most scientists would assert that it is precisely the universality of a
particular discipline that defines it as a science. Some fields are less
yielding than others; the notion of a relativist physics (as opposed to a
physics of relativity!) is anathema. While rival claimants of a physical
truths are acceptable, on a provisional or tentative basis, each claimant asserts universality. The "hardness" of a hard science refers in

part to the degree of systemization it enjoys and in part to the universality of its core claims. Biology is generally conceded to be "softer"
than mathematics, physics or chemistry, and so may be more open to
the operation of relativity. Human biology is likely "softer" still,
given the complexity of its subject and the undeniable influence of
self-consciousness and intentionality.
Certain writers on science describe bodies of knowledge such as

astrology, numerology, pyramid-power and the like as "superstition"
or "anti-science. ' 41 Indeed there is a movement among traditional
scientists to denounce and suppress anti-science.42 While the targets
tend to be both intellectually defenseless and silly, these attacks by
traditional scientists reveal a self-conception of a priesthood holding
certain and incontestable knowledge.
The law has often embraced a relatively uncritical view of science's claims of universal truth. Peter Huber has introduced the notion of an instrumental "junk science" 43 and contrasted it with "good
science""4 produced by mainstream institutional scientists. Michael
Rustad and Thomas Koenig have decried the presentation of misleading and dubious social science methodologies in amicus briefs. The
now repudiated Frye rule would have limited expert testimony to evi4
dence that was "generally accepted" by the scientific community.
41 See GELL-MANN, Tnm QUARK AND THE JAGUAR: ADVENTUREs IN THE SIMPLE AND THE

COMPLEX 275-90 (1994). See also GERALD HOLTON, SCIENCE AND ANTI-SCIENCE (1993).

42 See GELL-MANN, supranote 41, at 287 (describing Gell-Mann's decision to join the Committee for Scientific Investigation of Claim of the Paranormal, which publishes the journal
SrPICAL INQUIRER.)
43 PETER HUBER, GALLEO's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 2

(1991). See

also Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective
Distortionin Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REv. 91 (1993).

44 Huber writes that the best test of certainty that courts have is "good science-the science of
publication, replication, and verification, the science of consensus and peer review." HUBER,
supra note 43.
45 The Supreme Court held that scientific assertions presented by experts would be governed
by the ordinary Federal Rules of Evidence. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 113 S.
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Problems of appropriate inference from scientific knowledge compounds the difficulties proposed here. Scientific norms resist being
shoehorned into legal categories.46
There are philosophers and sociologists of science who purport
to demonstrate that very little of science, including "hard" science,
can claim universality and that science is largely a social construct.
Even mathematics, it has been claimed, is contingent.47 The recent
Social Text hoax brought out hard science's uncomfortable co-existence with relativism. In 1996 Alan Sokal, a New York University
physics professor, published a piece in Social Text, a leading cultural
studies journal, which argued that "physical 'reality' ... is at bottom a
social and linguistic construct."4 " The special issue of Social Text
which contained Sokal's piece was titled "Science Wars" and was "to
question the foundations of scientific thinking" by invoking "social
constructivism. ' 49 Upon publication of the "Science Wars" issue,
Sokal revealed his article was a parody,5" intentionally written "so that
any competent physicist or mathematician (or undergraduate physics
or math major) would realize it is a spoof." Sokal remains committed
to certain common-sense universal claims, such as the existence of
gravity.5 The Social Text controversy has largely devolved into a debate about academic honesty. 52
The degree to which science is constructed need not be resolved
for purposes of this essay. And, for purposes of this argument, the
hardest of the sciences can be permitted to stand. In general, the science which underlies regulation, including SPS regulation, is science
Ct. 2786 (1993). See the discussion of Daubert and Frye in Rustad & Koenig, supra note 43, at
97-99, nf. 31-32, and in Linda Simard & William G. Young, Daubert's Gatekeeper: The Role of
the DistrictJudge in Admitting Expert Testimony, 68 TuL L. Rav. 1457 (1994).
46 See Charles Kester, The Language of Law, the Sociology of Science and the Troubles of
Translation: Defining the ProperRole for Scientific Evidence of Causation,74 NEB. L. REv. 529
(1995). Rustad and Keonig have proposed the establishment of "social science courts" which
would be more adept technically at making appropriate inferences. Rustad & Koening, supra
note 43, at 159-60.
47 See BLOOR, supra note 10, at 107-30.
48 Alan D. Sokal, Transgressingthe Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of
Quantum Gravity, 46-47 Soc. TEXT 217 (1996).
49 See Christina Stock, Parody Gives Duke Press UnsettlingDose of Reality, RALEIGH NEWS
& OBsERv., May 18, 1996, at 2-3, available in 1996 WL 2879662.
50 Sokal, supra note 9. See also Alan D. Sokal, Transgressingthe Boundaries: An Afterword,
43 DISSENT 93 (1996).
51 According to Sokal, "Anyone who believes that the laws of physics are mere social conventions is invited to try transgressing those conventions from the window of my apartment (I
live on the 21st floor)." Reprinted in Stock, supra note 49, at 3.
52 According to SOCIAL TEX's editor Andrew Ross, Sokal's act was "an adolescent male
prank ... We thought he was writing in good faith, but he wasn't." Stock, supra note 49, at 4.
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applied to immense complexity. The human body, the ecology of a
particular locale and the interplay of social factors are all enormously
complex systems, about which strong scientific assertion breaks down.
Heuristics (rules-of-thumb) replace direct observation and synthesis in
guiding the formation of scientific consensus and introduce the possibility of multiple outcomes.
In some ways, the SPS regimes project a more critical outlook on
science than does science itself. Specifically, the SPS disciplines do
not insist on justification premised on the "best" or "truest" science
and admit, at least implicitly, the possibility of multiple, mutually-exclusive, sciences. The call for a scientific basis may be satisfied by one
of several rival claimants-for universal truth. A claim may be considered scientifically sound if a minimal consensus has formed around it.
Imagine that a group of scientists shares the conclusion that pasteurization impairs the nutritive value of beer.5 3 They may not constitute
more than a handful of the world-wide scientific community concerned with the matter and may further be concentrated in a particular locale. Their notion may not have overwhelmed rival
propositional claims to achieve a status of the dominant scientific consensus. But it may well be adequately shared to constitute a scientific
view, tentatively admitted as such, until definitively rejected by a tri54
umphant alternative propositional claim.
The SPS regimes expect nationality to emerge as a fairly strong
determinative factor in the formation of rival scientific consensus.
This is not a surprising view, given the national organization of academies, research bureaus, learned societies and the like. We can anticipate many cases where scientific consensus is split along national lines.
Beef hormones may be such an example; we need not reach the cynical view that one group of scientists (say, the Europeans) is corrupted
by the economic interest of its country to account for the division of
opinion.
In the recent "mad cow disease" affair, the United Kingdom had
maintained that the European Union's ban on exports of British beef
was entirely without scientific justification. Even if this were so, the
EU might offer a "precautionary principle" justification for the ban:
given the coincidence of the mad cow disease and a related disease in
53 This seemed to be the view of German authorities in arguing for the traditional beer
purity law. Case 178/84, Commission v. Germany, [1988] 1 C.M.L.R. 780.

54 I am not here describing the process of the scientific revolutions advanced by Kuhn.
Rather, the contests among minor propositions supporting a regulatory stance occur within Kuhnian "normal science," where basic paradigms are accepted. See the discussion infra.
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humans, and despite the showing of a link between the two, a ban is
an appropriate regulatory response pending further inquiry. The lesson of mad cow disease, however, is that "real" scientific linkage is
often not as important as popular perception.
The SPS regimes would support national regulation premised on
minority views within scientific communities. One could imagine a
food and drug law premised on Chinese herbalism, where imports of
certain products deemed healthful by Western scientific consensus are
restricted. The Chinese health authorities would maintain that the exclusion was appropriately based on risk assessment and had a scientific basis. Chinese science might astound us with its prescriptions.
Recently an authority on feng shui, a Chinese science of spatial relationships, warned of the ill effects caused by several Boston
landmarks, including I.M. Pei's John Hancock Tower in Copley
Square.
Both the WTO SPS Agreement and NAFrA's SPS provisions invoke science but provide little guidance as to what science is. Sociologists of science describe science in a variety of ways: as a community,
as a dialogue and as a consensus, for examples. We can know with
certainty, however, that science is not fixed, either in time or in space.
There is, however, a geography of science; scientific opinion, whatever
that might mean, is concentrated in centers chiefly located in the
United States, Europe and Japan. These centers of scientific authority
correspond, not accidentally, to the major players in the world trading
system.
It is not clear to what extent nations removed from the scientific
centers of authority can obtain the science they need to support desired regulatory outcomes. Poorer nations may not be able to afford
to sponsor studies necessary to resist challenges as to the scientific
basis for chosen regulatory responses. "Borrowed" science may not
only be irrelevant; it may be antagonistic. 55 Science is a received tradition in many parts of the world; a tradition that may systematically
underweigh local values. Those nations hosting scientific centers may
more easily meet the burden of demonstrating a scientific basis to
their regulatory stances. For these nations, science is more proximate
and is more embedded in their social-cultural-political milieu. And
55 Thai Cigarettesmay be an example of the pitfalls faced by a country seeking to justify a
measure based on off-the-rack science. Thailand was unable to demonstrate a health-risk differential between Thai cigarettes and imported ones. The panel heard a report provided by the
World Health Organization which generally focused on the public health risks of smoking. Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, GATT, B.I.S.D. (37th
Supp.) at 200; 30 I.L.M. 1122 (1991). See the discussion in Wirth, supra note 6, at 848-49.
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science can be bought, at least in the sense that funding can direct
scientific inquiry to questions posed by the regulating state.
Sociologists have observed the construction of science, and see it
an ordinary case of human activity. Scientists receive a tremendous
amount of framework before embarking on investigation, which colors all they observe. Some of this conditioning is comprised of settled
assertions learned by rote. Much of scientific teaching involves a recounting of the establishment of basic propositions in a field, which
typically remain unchallenged during a scientist's career. Conditioning also results from the dominant paradigms into which observations
are fitted and reconciled. A quantum physicist will note phenomena
that a Newtonian physicist will miss (and perhaps vice versa); a shaman may observe spirits that are invisible to contemporary
Westerners.
Instrumentation and protocols are important vehicles for conditioning scientific observation.56 An ordinary scientific instrument
used in an experiment transports a vast amount of consensus. A scientist who uses nuclear magnetic resonance to analyze a compound
trusts implicitly in the physics, electronics and cybernetics that cause
the instrument to operate and give meaning to its data output, just as
a dowser trusts a divining rod to sense the presence of water.
As scientific activity is dispersed across a greater number of societies, a multiplicity of scientific views can be expected. More and
more regulatory positions will be defensible by colorable claims of a
scientific basis.
Karl Popper emphasized the fundamental nature of scientific activity as not saying what is true, but rather as usefully identifying
which statements are false.5 7 Hypotheses can never be established;
certain "wrong" hypotheses may, however, be dismissed in light of
experience. Knowledge is tentative, and the scientific project is skeptical, destructive and eliminatory. Popper's view would suggest that
an assertion of scientific justification for a measure rings hollow.
Rather, a claim of scientific basis should be understood to mean that
scientific investigation has simply not been able to disprove a particular assertion to date, no more and no less. Indeed, the only scientific
certainty to be found is where a hypothesis fails, which corresponds to
finding the absence of scientific justification for a measure. The irony
56 BRUNO LATOUR, LABORATORY LIF.

57 KARL R. POPPER, TEr Looic OF SCINTIFIC DISCOVERY (1962). See discussion in CAN
THEORIS BE REFUTED? - ESSAYS ON THE DUHEM-QUINE Tr-nsis (SANDRA G. HARDING ed.,

1976).
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here is that a nation can act affirmatively only in situations where it is
ignorant; that is, it can only assert a "scientific basis" for a regulatory
move where science has not yet worked its falsifying power!
Popper's view would characterize the regulatory field-of-action as
one where there is an absence of scientific certainty of any kind. This
interpretation is a particularly expansive one. The untested may
greatly exceed the stock of proven falsehoods. Scientific progress, of
Popper's kind, would reduce the scope for regulation over time, as
fewer tentative assertions of scientific basis would be left standing.
Popper's view of science does in fact capture the residual power
of the science-based regulatory regimes. Nations can attack the regulatory positions of trading partners by demonstrating that a position
lacks a scientific foundation (and therefore constitutes an unjustified
restraint on trade). This is all that science can do and is precisely the
nature of the claims permitted under the WTO SPS Agreement.
Thomas Kuhn's view of the scientific program focuses on radical
shifts in world-view, the so-called paradigm changes, as marking scientific progress. 58 Paradigm shifts are infrequent, and most of which we
know as science, what Kuhn calls "normal science," involves testing
hypotheses within the then dominant paradigm. Except for the special conditions of paradigm substitution, constructs which do not comport with the dominant paradigm are dismissed. This is a process of
interpretation, not of observation, and as such, not particularly rooted
in experience. Kuhn's view of normal science is a search for consistency, as opposed to a search for truth.
The conclusion that a particular SPS measure has a scientific basis
is an assertion that the understanding of the operation of the physical
world implicit within the regulatory design is consistent with the dominant Kuhnian paradigm. Understandings outside of the paradigm will
fail. Kuhn's paradigms, of course, are not ultimate truth, but rather
provisional systems to be dismissed when overcome by a rival paradigm in a scientific revolution. Kuhn's analysis points out the contingency *of the scientific basis test, as being more based on received
constructions that on either pure observation (which Kuhn would argue is not a meaningful concept) or an ultimate truth.

58 THOMAS S. KumN, THE STRucruRE OF ScrNTn c REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). Kuhn
introduced the notion of a scientific paradigm, an overall framework received by most scientists
into which observations are fitted.
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SCIENCE AND REGULATORY GEOGRAPHY

The formation of scientific consensus will have strong and transparent regulatory implications under the new standards regimes, raising the stakes and influence of a scientific project. To assert the
presence or absence of a scientific basis for a proposition will become
a political act with international significance. A political-economic
analogy of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle would assert that the
presence of strong regulatory consequences will inevitably distort the
creation of science, rendering any claim of "truth" for scientific observations doubtful. Cross-border flows of scientific consensus will become an important mode through which regulatory harmonization
proceeds. A scientific consensus which takes the form of a skeptical
negative assertion, that no scientific basis lies for a particular proposition, will be most powerful, as it opens a ground for a regulatory
challenge.
The dynamics of globalization often, but not always, urge regulatory convergence. Harmonizing standards encourages the development, production and exchange of goods and services across borders.
Where standards are consistent, greater economics of scale are available to producers, some of which are passed on to consumers. From
the point of view of free trade, diverging regulation creates an economic drag.
Convergence of regulatory standards may result from various
forces. Supranational institutions, quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial,
may compel nations to adopt harmonization.5 9 A nation which joins
the European Union understands that it must revamp much of its regulatory program to meet existing European harmonized standards or
face censure in the Court of Justice. The European Council promulgates standards which are binding on all EU members. While dispute
resolution panels under either the WTO or the NAFTA lack the
power of the EU's Court of Justice to command compliance, they may
nonetheless motivate harmonization by isolating instances of regulatory variation and testing them for justification.
Harmonized standards may result from parallel regulatory enactment by nations even where supranational institutions are lacking.
Where efficiency gains from harmonization are substantial and where
the gains are distributed somewhat evenly, noncoerced convergence
will result. These may well be dynamic or path-dependent effects in
59 Regulatory convergence always benefits some countries at other countries' expense. Convergence, where compelled, is an artifact of power, and effects a wealth transfer between nations. See discussion in Atik, supra note 32, at 94.
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play: nations may race to establish favorable regulatory standards
that follower nations will be constrained to accept. Notwithstanding
these kinds of strategic opportunities, international regulatory harmonization as a kind of noninstitutional cooperation can result under
particular conditions.
Convergence may be a matter of little choice to a smaller nation,
which is likely to be a "regulation taker." A country with few economies of scale and lacking market power is unlikely to be able to impose a diverging regulatory standard without bearing a
disproportionate cost. Further, effective standards may be "voluntarily" adopted by producer groups without state compulsion. Voluntary self-regulation may be engaged to preempt more restrictive
formal regulation.6 ° Cooperating producers desiring harmonization
may similarly seek to preempt the introduction of diverging standards
by self-regulating. A formal standard in one country may be echoed
by harmonized custom in another. Product standards established by
major market authorities may be indirectly "imported" into other jurisdictions; standard-complying goods may pass into standard-free ter61
ritories, physically transmitting nation-of-origin regulatory results.
Minor markets often choose to rely on regulation imposed by other
jurisdictions as assurance of public health and safety concerns in lieu
of direct regulation.
An interesting example of regulatory standard migration can be
found in U.S. interstate commerce experience. The Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania has for years maintained an elaborate system of
bakery regulation; producers of bread and cereal products wishing to
sell into Pennsylvania are subject to inspection. The remaining 49
states largely defer to Pennsylvania's regulatory scheme, free-riding in
a sense on regulatory costs borne by Pennsylvania, but ceding substantive regulatory authority to Pennsylvania's notions.
Wide divergences in SPS regulatory approaches are often observed, at times resulting in contradictory prescriptions. An example
is the European Union muesli case. Sandoz produced muesli break60 Cigarette manufacturers "volunteered" to cease advertising their products on US television broadcasts. This move successfully avoided more general advertising restrictions on cigarettes and the prospect of government-sponsored counter advertising. Recently U.S. distilleries
agreed to revoke their voluntary ban on hard liquor broadcast advertising. See Stuart Elliott,
Liquor Industry Ends Its Ad Ban in Broadcasting,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1996, at Al.
61 Automobile day-time running lights are required in Sweden. Volvo and SAAB
automobiles, which are manufactured in Sweden, are equipped with running lights even when
imported into the United States. See e.g., Nina Paddgett, Daytime Lights-on Driving Coming to
U.S. Roads Soon, Cm. SUN TIMms, Aug. 5, 1996.
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fast cereal treated with vitamins A and D, a move many would view as
conducive to good health and permitted under German and Belgian
food laws. The Netherlands sought to ban the import of the vitaminenhanced muesli from Germany and Belgium as harmful to human
health, on the theory that it might lead to overconsumption of fatsoluble vitamins.62 Such regulatory variation may be a sign of political
health and provides useful test cases in control techniques that benefit
all nations facing similar problems.
This is not to say that there is an absence of harmonizing norms
at the international level. For example, Codex Alimentarius indirectly
sets standards for foodstuffs for human consumption. 63 Regional institutions, such as the EU Commission, have been active in harmonizing health and safety standards. And both the NAFTA and the WTO
standards agreements privilege national measures that are consistent
with international standards-making bodies.
While scientific validity may serve to justify regulatory differences, it may also serve as a basis for shared regulatory approaches.
Shared science may generate new regulatory geographies, corresponding to the influence exerted by particular scientific centers of authority. There is a geography of science, or more particularly, of sciences.
Science, if measured by factors such as research expenditures, published papers or number of doctorates, is largely centered in Europe,
the United States and Japan. India has an important presence in certain fields as well. Analyzing specific scientific disciplines reveals
more geographic texture; the Italians, for example, are prominent
vulcanologists.
Physicians and epidemiologists trained in the United States are
likely to share a similar vision even when exercising their professions
in other countries.64 Even regional differences arise in response to
training; a recent study has shown that radically different approaches
cardioloin recommended treatment are taken by East Coast-trained
65
gists than by their West Coast-trained colleagues.
62 Case 174/82, Criminal Proceedings Against Sandoz BV, 1983 E.C.R. 2445.
63 See the extensive discussion of Codex Alimentarius in Wirth, supra note 6, at 825 n. 29.
Similarly, L'Office International des Epizooties and the Secretariat of the International Plant
Protection Convention have been active in setting standards with respect to animal and plant
disease. See Understandingthe World Trade OrganizationAgreement on Sanitaryand Phytosanitary Measures, supra note 25.

64 Indeed they may speak with more authority in foreign countries on account of their U.S.
scientific training than they would in the United States.
65 G. Langley et al., Use of Written Cases to Study FactorsAssociated with Regional Variations in Referral Rates, 44 J. CuiN. EPIDEMIOL. 391 (1991).
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Scientific traditions may promote regulatory convergence based
not on trade efficiencies but on the happenstance of received scientific
traditions. Universities and research institutes may grow as determinative institutions for economic integration. Many prominent members of recent Mexican governments, including Presidents Salinas and
Zedillo, completed U.S. doctoral programs in economics. This shared
scientific vision helped precipitate the marked shift in Mexican economic policy away from import substitution and toward economic integration with the United States. Stephen Zamora has noted the
increasing presence of Mexichanges exerted on Mexican law by the 66
schools.
law
U.S.
in
trained
can lawyers
Scientific determinations may serve as an alternate source of lawmaking within institutional accords such as the WTO and the NAFTA,
both of which lack formal lawmaking institutions. Assuming a flow of
dispute resolution decisions under the WTO and the NAFTA, there
may come to be a "common law" of scientific determinations. A regulatory measure upheld by a WTO or the NAFTA dispute panel may
likely be immune from further challenge, and might well be adopted
by other nations with a high degree of confidence. Thus, over time
there may be a cumulative growth of permitted trade restrictions.
Once blessed as supported by scientific justification, a trade restriction
may be replicated and become thereby an effective standard for a
larger territory. Should a NAFTA panel find a Canadian health regulation justified with respect to a U.S. product, Mexico might feel invited to impose a parallel restriction, premised on a kind of stare
decisis. And so too might a WTO member, anticipating that a DSU
panel might well give weight to the prior determination of the
NAFTA panel upholding the regulation.
This precedential pattern may work with respect to negative findings as well. Once a panel, established either under the WTO's DSU
or NAFTA, finds a purported health regulation to be without scientific foundation, such a measure will likely no longer be supportable
by either the party to the dispute or by any other nation.67
66 See Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: The
Side Effects of Free Trade, 12 Amz. J. INT'L & ComP. L. 401, 424 (1995). For an overview of

formal and informal U.S. influences on Mexican domestic law, see Stephen Zamora, The Americanization of Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues in the North American Free TradeAgreement, 24
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 391 (1993).
67 When an allegedly scientifically-unfounded SPS measure is maintained by a number of
countries, it might make strategic sense to initiate dispute resolution against the weakest country, and then use the resulting finding against the remaining countries applying the measure.
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A more serious concern arises where risks are found acceptable
with respect to a domestic product, but are banned with respect to an
arguably comparable import. Disputes over pesticide residues often
fit this pattern. Higher tolerances for pesticides are permitted for locally-grown produce than are tolerated in partly-substitutable foreign
produce.68 The most difficult case, and perhaps a special one, results
from tobacco products, which are legal in most places. Were the risk
from smoking deemed "tolerable" for the broad public, many SPS
measures would be wiped away, as they address less substantial risks.
Perhaps risk assessment breaks down in the case of addiction, much as
does ordinary economics.
The new standards regimes do not satisfactorily resolve the situation of "battling science," typified by the U.S.-European beef hormone dispute. One would suppose that the Europeans would argue
that "science" supports the ban against hormone-stimulated beef
whereas the United States would argue that science proves the beef's
harmlessness.69 In cases such as these, the regulating authority and
the challenging nation assert scientific justification for their respective
positions. One nation will offer the affirmative position; the other, the
negative. In the beef hormones dispute, EU scientists would make an
affirmative argument: that science supports the existence of a risk to
consumers of hormone-stimulated beef. United States scientists
would make the negative argument: that there is no proof that the
hormone-stimulated beef poses a risk to human health.
The proof argued may simply be the absence of a positive finding.
This can only be persuasive where there are a host of studies testing a
link but finding none. We cannot prove that caffeine is harmless; we
can only point to a large number of studies testing caffeine usage
against various pathologies that fail to find meaningful association.
Institutional science will make such negative pronouncements where
the regulatory stakes are high enough. Recently the National Research Council presented a study concluding that there was no convincing evidence that exposure to radiation from power lines poses a
68 See, eg., Case 94/83, Criminal Proceedings Against Albert Heijn, 1984 E.C.R. 3263.
69 Note that the U.S. position is not that hormone-treated beef has a low-probability of risk;
rather the U.S. argues that as the beef itself lacks the hormones, it is physically identical to nontreated beef, and therefor, as a scientific certainty, poses no marginal threat to human health. See
Jackson, supranote 14, at 435. See generally Michael B. Froman, InternationalTrade-The United
States-European Community Hormone Treated Beef Conflict, 30 HAnv. INT'L L.J. 549 (1989);
Adridn Rafael Halpem, The U.S.-EC Hormone Beef Controversy and the StandardsCode: Implications for the Application of Health Regulations to Agricultural Trade, 14 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 135 (1989).
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health hazard. The Council reached this conclusion while noting the
existence of studies showing a statistically significant risk for leukemia
in children living near power lines.7 °
Negative arguments of this type can rarely resolve disputes. That
no study has shown a risk does not preclude the risk's existence.
More powerful are negative arguments based on a lack of a scientific
basis: that the dominant paradigms do not permit assertions of causality that underlies a particular regulatory response.
Even more challenging would be cases, such as muesli, where affirmative scientific justifications can be argued both for the regulation
and for its removal. These cases may involve disputes about inference
within a dominant paradigm, or may reflect the existence of two rival
paradigms, neither of which has attained dominancy. SPS measures
present many of these difficult cases.71
In resolving disputes, both WTO SPS Agreement and NAFTA
permit the charging of "experts" to advise dispute resolution panels
on scientific matters. While appointment of such experts is not
mandatory, it is likely, particularly given criticism of past GAT dispute panels for encroaching on scientific determinations. 72 "Experts"
are likely to behave differently than do ordinary dispute panelists.73
They are more likely to recognize the presence of a scientific justification for a challenged measure where the scientific assertion is recognized in the specific community to which they belong.
V.

CONCLUSION

With the Uruguay Round amendments to the GATr system now
set, the standards regime has been substantially universalized. Both
the WTO TBT Agreement and the WTO SPS Agreement are included among the WTO's "Multilateral Trade Agreements." As such,
both of these agreements are mandatorily binding on the entire WTO
membership. Under the WTO arrangements, national technical stan70 See Warren Leary, PanelSays Electric Fields Pose No Known Hazard,N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 1,

1996.
71 Many pharmaceutical products have both harmful and healthful effects, depending on individual characteristics, dosage and length of application. Birth control pills may increase risks
of certain cancers, but also reduce other risks. Under the SPS regimes, a country could ban a
product having a mixed effect, premised on a risk assessment of a particular effect, even when its
benefits arguably outweigh these risks.
72 In the fish landing dispute with Canada, a GATI dispute panel found the Canadian requirement that 100 percent of the catch be off-loaded in Canada to be unsupported by science.
Wirth, supra note 6, at 845-47 & nn.106 & 119. This report has been sharply criticized for not
deferring to Canadian scientific expertise. Id. at 847.
73 See id. at 852-53.
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dards, including important SPS measures, are now subject to international scrutiny. As a general proposition, national regulatory
discretion is circumscribed within all WTO members. For the first
time, most of the world's nations must potentially answer to dispute
resolution panels about the appropriateness of their national regulation. However, the express reservation of national prerogative in SPS
rulemaking and the cloaking effect of the scientific basis test will cause
SPS measures to be less open to trade challenge. Where scientific justification is present, national competence to regulate is hardly diminished. Both WTO SPS Agreement and NAFTA's SPS provisions
permit countries to freely make risk assessment, setting standards as
high or low as they see fit. 74 The science-based disciplines create new
premises for the maintenance of national prerogatives in the face of
globalizing regulatory power.
Science is a much challenged notion in contemporary thinking; as
such, 'it promises little hope as a source for neutral principles to resolve economic disputes among nations. Science is a product of what
questions are asked of it: a system that requires scientific bases for
self-interested positions is likely to find them. Science is hardly as
universal as one might first imagine; the history of trade disputes already has demonstrated the possibility of rival scientific positions urging contrary regulatory stances. Scientific consensus is geographically
distributed and flows from centers of influence. A science-based regulatory scheme will reveal patterns of convergence that differ markedly
from patterns generated by trade volumes and geographic proximity.
Science may, however, lead to a new kind of international discourse, where certain moves are excluded. Acceptance of certain
lines of scientific reasoning by international dispute panels may have
precedential effect. The validation of certain "scientific voices" will
further exacerbate the democracy problem affecting trade pacts generally, and will effect internal allocations of power and influence. Nations commanding resources for the establishment of scientific
consensus will be able to exert important influence on the look of national regulation througout the world. Science risks losing its prestige
as it falls into instrumentalized use, another politicized ideology explicitly directed by money and power.

74 The notion of "high" and "low" standards has multiple interpretations. They may describe a nation's standards relative to others, or they may capture the implicit valuation of the
avoided harm. See Atik, supra note 32, at 94.
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